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Abstract. After a decade of steady growth in the acceptance of the existence of climate 
change and its anthropogenic causes, opinions have polarized, with almost one-third of 
Americans, mostly Republicans, denying that the climate is changing or that human activity is 
responsible. What causes Americans to change their minds on this issue?  Using a large panel 
data set, we examined the impacts of direct experience with weather anomalies, ideology, 
relative prioritization of environmental conservation in comparison to economic development, 
and motivated reasoning that adjusts individual opinion to align with others who share one’s 
party identification. A generalized ordered logit model confirmed the importance of political 
ideology, party identification, and relative concern about environmental conservation and 
economic development on attitude change.  The effect of party identification strengthened with 
attentiveness to news and public affairs, consistent with the logic of motivated reasoning. Recent 
experience with hot summers, warm winters, droughts, and natural disasters had only a minimal 
impact on attitude change.     
Key Words: climate change, longitudinal survey, opinion change, motivated reasoning, political 
ideology 
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 The United States lags behind much of the world in support for action to mitigate climate 
change (Ipsos MORI, 2014). Almost one-third of Americans, primarily Republicans, believe 
either that climate change is not occurring or that it is not due to human activity (Riffkin, 2014; 
Leiserowitz et al, 2016; Mills et al, 2016).  The Pew Research Center found that 79 percent of 
liberal Democrats, but only 15 percent of conservative Republicans believed that as a result of 
human activity, the earth is warming (Funk and Kennedy, 2016, 9).  
Belief about the existence and causes of global climate change are also related to values 
concerning the relative importance of job growth as opposed to environmental conservation.  As 
Heath and Gifford noted (2006, 65-66), “those who value the free market system over 
environmental quality tend to believe that global change is not occurring, that the causes of 
global climate change are more natural than human caused, and that its consequences will not be 
negative.”  
The process by which individuals develop and change their views about climate change is 
complex.  In this paper, we demonstrate that a national sample of Americans changed their 
opinions between 2010 and 2014 primarily to align better with those who share their party 
identification and political ideology.  This conforms with the theory of motivated reasoning: that  
evidence consistent with prior beliefs is viewed as strong, and that on politically salient issues, 
people strive to bring their opinions into conformance with those who share their political 
identity (Kahan et al., 2012).  
Previous studies, aggregating cross-sectional surveys across time have identified trends 
and polarization in overall public opinion, but have not been able to track how individuals 
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modify their attitudes over time. The contribution of this paper is its analysis of a nationally 
representative panel of 9500 respondents who were asked the same question about climate 
change in 2010 and 2014.  These data provide the basis for the first large-sample empirical 
analysis of individual opinion change on global warming.  Using these data, we identified people 
who maintained the same opinion as opposed to those who changed their opinions, becoming 
either more concerned or more skeptical about climate change.  We then examined the relative 
importance of political ideology, party identification, relative concern about the environment in 
comparison with the economy, and recent experience with anomalous weather patterns on 
stability or shifts in opinion. The empirical analysis supports the theory of motivated reasoning: 
Americans tend to align their opinions on climate change to match those of others who share 
their political party or political ideology.  
 
Findings About Beliefs in Climate Change from Cross-Sectional Studies 
Belief in the existence of climate change and its anthropogenic causes has not grown 
consistently in the United States. Based on a review of 240 articles published between 1980 and 
2014, Capstick et al. (2015) showed that acceptance of the existence of climate change grew 
steadily from the 1980s through the early 1990s, but was more erratic in the next decade.  More 
recently, skepticism has grown and opinions have polarized along political party lines. Studies 
from the Yale Project on Climate Change reported that although a slowly growing majority of 
Americans are worried about global warming,  only a minority believe human action is causing it 
(Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013, Roser-Renouf et al., 2014).  Furthermore, those who believe that 
the climate change is not changing have become more certain in their beliefs (Leiserowitz et al. 
2015).  
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A vast literature has examined trends in beliefs about the existence of and causes for 
climate change, and the correlates of these beliefs.  The findings of this research form the basis 
of the hypotheses about the influence of four sets of variables on receptivity to messages about 
climate change: (1) opinion leaders or membership in a social network; (2) direct experience 
with weather events that could be linked to global climate change, (3) science education as well 
as general scientific literacy; and (4) demographic characteristics that pre-condition receptivity to 
messages about climate change.    
 
Influence of Opinion Leaders or Membership in a Social Network  
Early research suggested that a small number of “opinion leaders” shaped the influence of 
media on public opinion (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968).  
Zaller (1992) added the modification that those who are either less attentive to or less aware of 
the messages being promulgated by the elite are less likely to accept them.  Social networks and 
interactions can also influence the ways in which people form and change opinions (Watts and 
Dodds, 2007; Moussaid et al, 2013). People use several perspectives or “frames” to interpret 
information generally, especially information that has a highly political or emotional edge, and 
these frames matter more in opinion formation than the facts themselves (Chong and Druckman, 
2007; Hoffman, 2015).   
Both the framing of messages about climate change and the current association of the 
entire subject of climate change with political ideology have an overwhelming impact on 
acceptance of ideas about climate change (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014a, Brulle, 
Carmichael, and Jenkins, 2012, Druckman and Bolsen, 2011).  Kahan (2015a, 12) found that 
simply providing more accurate scientific information to the general public does not change 
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opinions, but instead reinforces prior views: “those whose cultural commitments predispose them 
to be concerned about climate change become even more so as their level of science 
comprehension increases.”  People selectively seek evidence that supports the position of the 
group with which they identify and dismiss evidence that contradicts it (van der Linden, 2015).  
The phenomenon of seeking information that confirms prior beliefs is known as 
“motivated reasoning” or “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998; Kahan 2015b).  One exhibits 
motivated reasoning when one “view[s] evidence consistent with prior opinions as stronger or 
more effective” (Druckman 2015, 60).  When political party shapes motivated reasoning, this 
phenomenon is labelled “partisan motivated reasoning” (Bolsen et al., 2014, Bolsen et al., 2015) 
or “politically motivated reasoning” (Kahan, 2015).  In this framing, individuals strive to shape 
their opinions on politically salient issues to conform with those of their party, reject information 
and ideas that conflict with party ideology, and become ever more convinced that their party’s 
position is accurate (Kahan et al., 2012).  
Political parties in the United States are sharply divided on climate change and its 
anthropogenic causes.  While the Democratic party views climate change as an urgent problem, 
the Republican party tends to deny or downplay its significance.  While the 2016 Democratic 
party platform characterizes climate change as “a real and urgent threat” and states that 
“Democrats share a deep commitment to tackling the climate challenge” (Democratic Party 
Platform Committee, 2016, 27), the Republican party platform notes that “climate change is far 
from this nation’s most pressing national security issue” and opposes “any carbon tax” 
(Republican National Committee, 2016, 20).  Further, many notable Republican leaders are not 
convinced that the planet is warming or that human activity is the primary driver of climate 
change (Gregoire, 2015; McCright, Dunlap and Xiao, 2014).  This difference between 
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conservative and liberal party positions seems to be unique to the United States (Båtstrand, 
2015). 
 
Direct Experience with Environmental Hazards or Temperature Variability  
 Some studies have found that personal experience with storms, floods, drought or 
temperature anomalies leads to greater acceptance of the existence of climate change. For 
example, respondents in the U.K. who had experienced flood damage expressed more concern 
about climate change (Spence et al., 2011).  Similarly, Elrick-Barr et al (2015) studied two 
coastal communities in Australia that were equally vulnerable to climate hazards and found that 
it was not proximity to the coast, but instead prior experience with the hazard, that increased 
perceived risk.  Brody et al (2008) also found only a weak relationship between proximity to 
flood-prone areas and risk perception, particularly in comparison with the impact of the 
personality variables they used as controls, including “perceived efficacy” and “new ecological 
values” (Brody et al, 2008, 88). 
 Several studies have focused on warmer summer or winter temperatures in affecting 
perceptions of climate change.  Hamilton and Keim (2009) found that in U.S. regions 
accustomed to winter snow, relatively warm winters were associated with increased concern with 
climate change.  Zaval et al. (2014) and Li, Johnson and Zaval (2011) found that respondents 
expressed greater concern about global warming on hot summer days, and speculated that people 
may substitute the current temperature for general trends when thinking about global warming.  
Similarly, Borick and Rabe (2010, 6) found that respondents identified “warmer temperatures in 
your area during recent years” as a major influence on their views that “the earth is getting 
warmer.”   In contrast, Egan and Mullin (2012) found that any effect of the daily temperature 
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immediately before or at the time of the survey on opinion about global warming was likely to be 
temporary.  
Three studies found that warmer-than-normal summers and winters had an effect, but 
only in combination with prior beliefs about climate (Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013, Hamilton and 
Stampone, 2013, Clayton et al., 2015). In contrast, Deryugina (2013) matched a sample of US 
adults from the Gallup Environmental Poll for 2003-2010 with local weather information, and 
found that short-run temperature fluctuations lasting between 1-14 days had no effect on beliefs 
about global warming.  Even extreme events such as “Snowmaggedon” and Superstorm Sandy 
did not seem to alter climate change perception (Trenberth et al., 2015, Lehner and Stocker, 
2015, Saad, 2015).  In trying to account for this absence of effect, Mastandrea et al. (2006) 
hypothesized that Americans do not consider climate change to be as important and immediate as 
other environmental issues. Leiserowitz and Broad (2006, 55) noted that the image that many 
Americans have of the impacts of global warming, such as melting polar icecaps, are distant 
from everyday experience: “most Americans lacked vivid, concrete, and personal-relevant 
affective images of climate change, which helps explain why climate change remains a relatively 
low priority national or environmental issue.”  In addition, many Americans believe that even if 
climate change does cause disruption, society will either adapt or find a technological solution.  
Because of their mid-latitude location, Americans may also find it difficult to experience 
“climate change” directly, and for those who live in areas where summers and winters have 
sharply different temperature ranges, the experience of cold in the winter may erase the memory 
of the previous hot summer (Weber, 2010, Van Der Linden, 2014, Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013). 
Indeed, a recent survey found that some view climate change as a positive trend, particularly for 
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those Americans who have experienced relatively mild winters between 1974 and 2013 (Egan 
and Mullin 2016).   
Another issue that impedes a direct relationship between experienced weather and belief 
in climate change is the process that people must undertake to see the linkage. The probability 
that people connect weather patterns to global climate change is likely to be filtered by prior 
beliefs or ideology that affects the ways in which they process information. In addition, when 
people are exposed to weather anomalies but do not suffer serious consequences, they may 
become more confident that climate change is not occurring or that it is not serious (Saad, 2015, 
Brody et al., 2008) 
 
Science education and scientific literacy  
Some have hypothesized that directed science education about human-caused climate 
change can shift opinion overcoming ideological resistance. Guy et al. (2014) found such a 
pattern in Australia, and a 2008 survey in the United States (Borick and Rabe 2010) concluded 
that the 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and Al Gore’s 
documentary An Inconvenient Truth had a major impact on Americans’ attitudes on global 
warming. Presumably in response to both sources of information, American respondents cited 
images of shrinking glaciers and polar ice as the most important issues affecting their belief in 
global warming. In contrast, however, the preponderance of survey research in the United States 
has shown that scientific articles or assessment reports do not move public opinion (Brulle et al., 
2012, Hamilton, 2011, Hart and Nisbet, 2011, Zia and Todd, 2010). No matter how vivid the 
message or how strong the technical background of the audience, other factors are more 
important in shaping attitudes about climate change.   
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Demographic characteristics and receptivity to information about climate change 
Some research suggests that both gender and ethnicity may independently affect ideology 
or world-view, in turn shaping the receptivity to new information on climate change. Surveys 
have found that women are more concerned than men about climate change, perhaps due to 
differences in socialization and therefore the development of key values (McCright and Dunlap, 
2011). White males tend to be relatively more hierarchical and individualistic, and, as a result, 
show greater skepticism about any kind of risk, including the deleterious effects of global 
climate change (Kahan et al., 2007, Finucane et al., 2000).  
 
Hypotheses 
In sum, cross-sectional surveys have provided overwhelming evidence that ideology, 
party identification, and attitudes about environmental conservation vs. economic development 
strongly influence beliefs about climate change in the U.S.  Based on the theory of politically 
motivated reasoning, we hypothesized that people tend to shift their opinions over time to better 
match those of opinion leaders they respect, and that this effect is even stronger for those who 
pay more attention to messages from party elites.  We also explored the effects of education 
levels and personal experience with hot summers, warm winters, droughts, and weather-related 
natural disasters on changing beliefs about climate change.   
 
Data and Methods 
The nine cross-sectional surveys that make up the Cooperative Congressional Election 
Study (CCES) have provided the basis for many scholarly studies.  The CCES also includes a 
nationally representative 2010–14 panel, which repeatedly asked 9500 respondents the same 
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question about climate change.  YouGov/Polimetrix administers the “opt-in” internet-based 
survey, that compensates respondents with rewards or points for every survey they complete 
(Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2014).  Schaffner and Ansolabehere (2015a; 2015b) described the 
detailed sampling strategy, sample matching algorithm, and theoretical background for the panel 
study. They noted that YouGov re-interviewed 83 percent of the 2010 panel sample in 2012 and 
68 percent of the 2012 respondents in 2014.  Although any attrition decreases the 
representativeness of panel surveys, the overall retention rate of 56 percent compares favorably 
to the 41 percent retention rates reported in the 2000–2004 American National Election Studies. 
Sample composition did not change markedly between 2010 and 2014; although attrition was 
somewhat higher for blacks and non-voters, attrition rates were generally similar among 
subgroups (Schaffner and Ansolabehere, 2015a; 2015b).   
The dependent variable in this analysis was derived by comparing the 2010 and 2014 
responses to the following question: “From what you know about global climate change or 
global warming, which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?   
1. Global climate change has been established as a serious problem and immediate 
action is necessary, 
2. There is enough evidence that climate change is taking place and some action 
should be taken, 
3. We don’t know enough about global climate change and more research is 
necessary before we take any actions, 
4. Concern about global climate change is exaggerated and no action is necessary, or  
5. Global climate change is not occurring and this is not a real issue.” 
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We coded the  65 percent who gave the same response in both years as 0, the 17 percent who 
gave a lower-numbered answer in 2014 as -1, and the 18 percent who gave a higher-numbered 
answer in 2014 as +1. 
 We measured all individual-level independent variables in 2010 and experiences with 
weather anomalies within the period between the two surveys.  We used two dummy variables to 
distinguish Democrats and Republicans from independents, the reference group.  To test whether 
partisan respondents sought partisan information, we tested the interaction between party 
identification and interest in public affairs as measured on a four-level scale, based on responses 
to the question: “Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs 
most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. 
Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, 
some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?”  
We coded liberalism as a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (very conservative) to 5 (very 
liberal). We measured attitudes about the relative importance of environmental conservation 
versus economic development based on 2010 responses to the question, “Some people think it is 
important to protect the environment even if it costs some jobs or otherwise reduces our standard 
of living. Other people think that protecting the environment is not as important as maintaining 
jobs and our standard of living. Which is closer to the way you feel, or haven't you thought much 
about this?”  We coded this variable as 1 for those who said it was much more important to 
protect jobs and 5 for those who said it was much more important to protect the environment.  To 
test the “white male” effect, we introduced nine dummy variables for white women, and black, 
Hispanic, Asian, and “other” men and women.  
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 Because the CCES identifies the respondent’s county of residence, we were able to 
associate weather-related variables at the county level, using other data sets. To measure warm 
winters and hot summers, we used the mean January and July temperatures in the county from 
2011 to 2014, minus the mean temperatures for the same month from 1950 to 2010 (Menne et al, 
2010). Since most of the previous research has weather-related variables for much shorter 
periods ranging from that day’s temperature (Egan and Mullin, 2012) to up to one year 
(Hamilton and Stampone, 2013), we also ran models using only data from the previous year.  
The effects were similar to those reported.  The temperature data came from the Global 
Historical Climatology Network-Daily at National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
Across the entire sample, the average January temperature from 2011 through 2014 was slightly 
cooler (0.1 ˚C) than in 1950-2010, but the average July temperature was 0.5˚C higher than the 
baseline.  
We measured experience with drought using the number of weeks between November 
2010 and September 2014 that the county had moderate-to-extreme drought conditions (D1 to 
D4), using data from the United States Drought Monitor.  Four measures of the severity of eight 
natural disasters in the county between November 2010 and September 2014 were analyzed: the 
natural logarithms of total fatalities, injuries, crop damage, and property damage due to coastal 
flooding, drought, flooding, heat, hurricane/tropical storm, severe storm/thunder storm, tornado, 
or winter weather (Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute, 2014).   
  For the initial analysis, we compared the characteristics of people who did and did not 
change their opinions on climate change between 2010 and 2014.  We tabulated the differences 
between changers and non-changers with respect to party identification, ideology, relative 
importance of environmental conservation, interest in public affairs, race/ethnicity, gender, age, 
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and education.  Given the overwhelming impact of political party identification on beliefs about 
climate change, we then focused on opinion change among respondents who identified with the 
same political party in 2010 and 2014.   
 We ran generalized ordered logit models to assess the impact of our independent variables on 
whether respondents became more skeptical, did not change, or became more concerned about 
climate change between 2010 and 2014.1 Because the weather-related variables are measured at 
the county level, we clustered the standard errors at the same level.2 We could not use simple 
ordered logit analysis because our model violated the proportionality of odds assumption. To 
ease interpretation, we did not report the coefficients from the Stata gologit2 command 
(Williams, 2005).  Instead, we reported the marginal effects, also called the average partial 
effects or APE  (Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
Opinion Change from 2010 to 2014 
 Overall, the distribution of opinion on climate change was similar in 2010 and 2014. 
Changes tended to come at the two extreme ends of the spectrum: increases in those stating that 
climate change is not occurring or that climate change is a serious issue warranting action, 
balanced by small decreases in those stating that more research is needed (Table 1).  
  
                                                        
1 Ordered logistic regression assumes that the independent variables have linear (constant) 
impacts on the natural logarithms of the odds, rather than on the probabilities, of each belief.  
Thus, the impact of each independent variable on the probabilities varies across individuals.  The 
APE estimates the probability change for each individual in the data set, then calculates the mean 
of those changes.   
2 We also tested a multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression using the Stata meologit 
command.  The meologit command has a strength in recognizing that we are measuring the 
weather-related variables at the county level and the other variables at the individual level, but a 
weakness in not allowing us to relax the parallel odds assumption.  Nonetheless, meologit did not 
meaningfully change the findings.   
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Table 1 — Percentages Taking Each Position on Climate Change, 2010 and 2014  
 
2010 2014 
Global climate change is not occurring 6.2 7.6 
Concern is exaggerated; No action is needed 19.5 19.5 
More research is needed 20.0 18.4 
Enough evidence that climate change is taking place 27.0 24.8 
Global climate change is a serious issue; Action need 27.3 29.7 
Total 100 100 
Note: Sampling weight applied. 
 
 
However, more than 35 percent of the respondents gave different responses in 2014 than 
they had in 2010. Although one would expect some level of variability in survey responses with 
a repeated survey over a four-year period of time, this volume of change exceeded the variability 
noted on other survey items such as opinions on the Affordability Care Act, granting legal status 
to immigrants or gun control (Schaffner and Ansolabehere, 2015a, 21).  
The five responses were condensed into three categories (Table 2). The first category 
summarized those who are not concerned with global climate change: the combination of 
“Global climate change is not occurring and this is not a real issue” and “Concern about global 
climate change is exaggerated and no action is necessary.”  The second category “We don’t 
know enough about global climate change and more research is necessary before we take any 
actions” remained the middle position.  The third category was the combination of those 
concerned with global climate change: “Global climate change has been established as a serious 
problem and immediate action is necessary” and “There is enough evidence that climate change 
is taking place and some action should be taken.”  Cross-tabulations and chi squared tests 
compared the six groups off the diagonal to those in the same rows whose views remained the 
same between 2010 and 2014 (Table 3).   
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Table 2 – Percentages Changing Opinions between 2010 and 2014 
  
Climate Change (2014) 
Climate Change (2010) 
Climate change is not 
happening or is 
exaggerated 
More 
study is 
needed 
Climate change is 
occurring and demands 
action 
Climate change is not 
happening or is  
exaggerated 
77.4 19.1 3.5 
More study is needed 25.2 56.1 18.8 
Climate change is 
occurring and demands 
action 
2.1 6.5 92.4 
Note: Sampling weight applied.   
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Table 3 — Characteristics of Those Whose Opinions Changed 
 
 
2014: climate change is not 
happening or is 
exaggerated 
2014: more study is 
needed 
2014: climate change is 
occurring and demands  
action 
2010: climate change  
is not happening or is 
exaggerated 
 N = 363 
Moderate or liberal 
ideology 
Economy and  
environment are of  
equal importance 
Moderate interest in 
public affairs 
Independent or 
Democrat 
 
N = 109 
Below age 50 
Fewer post-graduate, more 
with “some college” 
Female 
Moderate, liberal ideology 
Economy and environment  
are of equal importance 
Democrat 
NOT white male 
2010: more study is 
needed 
N = 532 
Conservative to very 
conservative 
Economy is more 
important than the 
environment 
Interested in public affairs 
most of the time 
Republican 
 N = 335 
Below age 65 
Female 
Moderate to liberal 
Environment is somewhat 
more important than the 
economy 
Some interest in public 
affairs 
Democrat 
Nonwhite 
 
2010: climate change 
 is occurring and 
demands action 
N = 101 
More in age 40-50 group, 
fewer over 50 
Conservative to very 
conservative 
Less frequent for college 
educated 
Economy is more 
important than 
environment 
Some interest in  
public affairs 
Republican 
 
N = 281 
NOT in California 
Less well educated 
Female 
Conservative to very 
conservative 
Economic and 
Environment are 
equally important or 
economy is more 
important 
Infrequent interest in 
public affairs 
Independent or  
Republican 
NOT white male 
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Among those who said that climate change was not occurring in 2010, those who 
changed to saying that more research is needed in 2014 were more likely to be Democrats or 
independents, were moderate or liberal in ideology, placed equal importance on the economy and 
the environment, and showed moderate interest in public affairs.  The very small percentage who 
shifted from a belief that climate change is not occurring to the belief that it is occurring were 
more likely to be female, Democrats, under age 50, moderate or liberal, not white males, had a 
moderate interest in public affairs, gave equal weight to the economy and environment, and had 
started but not completed college.  
  Among those who said that more study was needed in 2010, respondents who shifted to 
believing that climate change is not happening or is exaggerated were more likely to be 
conservative or very conservative, to value the economy and jobs over the environment, to be 
interested in public affairs most of the time, and to be Republican. Those whose opinions shifted 
in the opposite direction, stating in 2014 that climate change is occurring, were more likely to be 
under 65, female, nonwhite, moderate to liberal, Democrat, and to view the environment as 
somewhat more important than the economy. 
  Finally, respondents who said that climate change is occurring in 2010 but said that 
climate change is not happening or is exaggerated in 2014 were more likely to be age 40-to-50, 
conservative to very conservative, Republican, to believe the economy is more important than 
the environment, and to have some interest in public affairs. The respondents who shifted to 
calling for more research on whether climate change is occurring by 2014 were less well 
educated, female, Republican, conservative to very conservative, felt the economy is equally or 
slightly more important than the environment, and were infrequently interested in public affairs.  
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Opinion Change Among Republicans, Democrats and Independents 
  To test the theory of motivated reasoning, we next focused on how political party 
affiliation affected the strength and direction of such change. For this analysis, we restricted the 
sample to the 85 percent (8,113 respondents) who had not changed their political party affiliation 
between 2010 and 2014.   
  Overall, a much small proportion of these respondents, 18 percent compared to the 35 
percent noted for the full sample, had changed their opinion over the 2010-2014 time period.  We 
found the impact of political party on the direction of change overwhelming (Table 4). 
Democrats were even more likely to attest that climate change is occurring and that this change 
demands action: the largest percentage of opinion changers were in the category of those who 
had formerly said more research was needed, and now were convinced that climate change was 
occurring.  On the other hand, Republicans were more likely to become more skeptical about 
climate change: 48.2 percent remained skeptical about climate change throughout the study 
period, and an additional 11.1 percent who had previously stated that more research was needed, 
reported by 2014 that climate change is not occurring or is exaggerated. 
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Table 4.  Attitude Change by Party Identification 
 
 Republican Independent Democrat 
Climate Change not occurring 2010    
  Climate Change not occurring 2014 84.7 73.4 48.5 
 More research in 2014 12.8 17.1 28.2 
 Climate change occurring in 2014 2.5 9.5 23.3 
 
  Sample size 2017 158 103 
    
More research needed in 2010     
 Climate Change not occurring 2014 38.2 20.0 12.4 
 More research in 2014 50.8 51.0 38.8 
 Climate change occurring in 2014 10.9 29.0 48.8 
 
  Sample size 1025 145 242 
    
Climate Change occurring 2010    
 Climate Change not occurring 2014 9.5 2.8 0.6 
 More research in 2014 22.8 10.4 2.4 
 Climate change occurring in 2014 67.7 86.7 96.9 
 
  Sample size 504 316 3403 
 
  The geographic pattern of opinion change when stratified by political party is complex 
(Figure 1).  Republicans who shifted from asking for more research in 2010 to being convinced 
that climate change is not occurring tended to be more concentrated in the southeastern part of 
the United States and in relatively more rural or suburban counties where they are likely to hold 
local majorities.   
  A generalized ordered logit analysis permits the identification of the relative importance 
of the independent variables (Table 5).  Each row shows how a one-unit increase in the 
independent variable changes the average probability of becoming more skeptical about, keeping 
the same opinion on, or becoming more convinced of global climate change.  Within each row, 
the probability changes sum to zero.  Thus, for example, a one-point rise in the relative 
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importance one placed on the environment relative to jobs in 2010 led to a 4.5 percent drop in 
one’s probability of becoming more skeptical about climate change by 2014.  This is offset by a 
4.3 percent increase in one’s probability of becoming more concerned, and a 0.3 percent increase 
in one’s probability of not changing one’s position. Similarly, respondents who were one level 
more liberal in 2010 were 4.8 percent more likely to increase their concern about climate change 
and 5.1 percent less likely to become more skeptical.  
  Republicans who almost never followed the news about public affairs were 9.5 percent 
more likely than comparable independents to become more concerned about climate change and 
10.7 percent less likely to become more skeptical. Democrats who almost never followed the 
news were 11.3 percent more likely than comparable independents to increase their concern and 
insignificantly less likely to increase their skepticism.  In other words, low-information 
Democrats were only 1.8 percent more likely than low-information Republicans to increase their 
concern and 8.4 percent less likely to become more skeptical. 
    For those interested in news and public affairs, however, the partisan effects were clear. 
Following the news did not change the opinion of independents much, but each one-point rise on 
the four-point news interest scale increased Republicans’ probability of becoming more skeptical 
about climate change by 5.7 percent and decreased their probability of becoming more concerned 
by 3.2 percent.  In contrast, following the news reduced Democrats’ chances of becoming more 
skeptical; each one-point rise on the four-point news interest scale reduced their probability of 
greater skepticism by 3.3 percent.  Thus, each one-point rise in news interest widened the gap 
between Republicans and Democrats by 9 percent. This is strong evidence for the motivated 
reasoning hypothesis: individuals find information to confirm the general ideology of the group 
to which they belong, and shift their beliefs towards the modal belief of their reference group.   
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 We found little evidence that direct experience with warmer weather, droughts, and 
weather-related natural disasters affected opinions about climate change. Of the weather-related 
independent variables, only warm winters had a statistically significant impact: a one-degree 
increase in average January temperatures relative to the baseline is associated with a 0.8 percent 
increase in the probability of rising concern and a 0.9 percent decrease in the probability of 
greater skepticism (Table 5). The impacts of hot summers, droughts, and natural disasters on 
change in opinion were not statistically distinguishable from zero. 
 The impacts of other variables on opinion change were weaker and less consistent. More-
educated and older respondents were less likely to become more skeptical about climate change.  
We found little evidence for the white male effect. Only “other” females were more likely than 
comparable white men to increase their concern about climate change between 2010 and 2014.  
Black women and black, Hispanic, and “other” men were all about 5 percent more likely than 
comparable white men to increase their skepticism. 
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Table 5. Changes in Opinions, 2010-2014 
Average Partial Effects from Generalized Ordered Logit Model 
 Change in Beliefs 
 
Became More 
Skeptical 
 Did Not 
Change 
 Became More 
Concerned 
Relative importance of environment and 
economy (1-5) -4.5***  0.3
*  4.3
*** 
 (0.4) 
 (0.1)  (0.3) 
 
     
Liberalism (1-5) -5.1***  0.3*  4.8*** 
 (0.4) 
 (0.1)  (0.4) 
      
Republicans      
    Almost never follows public affairs information -10.7†  1.1  9.5* 
 (5.5)  (2.0)  (4.2) 
      
Democrats       
    Almost never follows public affairs information -2.1  -9.3*  11.3* 
 (6.1)  (4.3)  (4.5) 
      
Interest in news and public affairs (1-4)      
    Republicans 5.7***  -2.5***  -3.2*** 
 (1.2)  (0.6)  (0.7) 
 
     
    Independents -2.3  0.0  2.3 
 (1.5)  (0.2)  (1.5) 
 
     
    Democrats -3.3***  1.5  1.8 
 (0.6)  (1.2)  (1.2) 
      
Education (1-5) -1.1**  1.2**  -0.2 
 (0.3)  (0.4)  (0.3) 
      
Age -0.1**  0.1
*  0.0 
 (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0) 
      
Weather-related variables      
Avg. Jan Temp Dev -0.9**  0.1
†  0.8
** 
 (0.3)  (0.0)  (0.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Avg. Jul Temp Dev 0.3  -0.0  -0.2 
 (0.4)  (0.0)  (0.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weeks of drought conditions (C2) 0.0  -0.0  -0.0 
 (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log total fatalities 0.4  -0.0  -0.4 
 (0.3)  (0.0)  (0.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log total injuries -0.0  0.0  0.0 
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 (0.2)  (0.0)  (0.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log total crop damages 0.0  -0.0  -0.0 
 (0.1)  (0.0)  (0.0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log total property damages -0.1  0.0  0.1 
 (0.1)  (0.0)  (0.1) 
      
White male effect?      
White female -0.8  0.0  0.7 
 (0.7) 
 (0.0)  (0.6) 
      
Black female 5.1**  -0.3†  -4.8** 
 (1.7) 
 (0.2)  (1.6) 
      
Hispanic female 2.3  -0.1  -2.2 
 (2.2) 
 (0.1)  (2.1) 
      
Other female 3.8  -11.3**  7.5* 
 (3.6) 
 (3.8)  (3.1) 
      
Black male 6.4*  -7.0*  0.6 
 (2.6) 
 (3.0)  (2.4) 
      
Hispanic male 5.0*  -8.3**  3.3 
 (2.0) 
 (2.6)  (2.3) 
      
Other male 4.9*  -0.3†  -4.6* 
 (2.0) 
 (0.2)  (1.9) 
      
Observations 1,347   5,085   1,442 
Standard errors, clustering at the county level, are in parentheses 
   
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
     
Respondent’s belief of climate change in 2010 is included in the model 
 
 
 
Conclusions   
Americans are becoming more polarized along partisan lines, and that change tends to 
bring the individual in line with the modal view of the political or ideological group with which 
the person identifies.  An overwhelming number of Democrats strongly believe that climate 
change is occurring and that immediate action is required.  Independents are also somewhat 
moving towards this point of view, although in smaller percentages.  Republicans, on the other 
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hand, generally remained convinced that climate change is not occurring or that its seriousness is 
exaggerated, and even those who sought more research on the topic in 2010 tended to become 
more skeptical of the existence of climate change by 2014.  This vast difference in perspective is 
also reflected in the 2016 political party platforms on climate change.  Democrats view climate 
change as “an urgent threat” and a “defining challenge,” while the Republican platform pledges 
to defeat the Clean Power Plan to cut energy sector greenhouse emissions and rejects the 2015 
Paris UN agreement on climate change.   
Using repeated surveys on the same individuals over a four-year period, this analysis 
suggests that the direction of change in opinion is clearly related to respondents’ political and 
environmental ideology, particularly when they pay more attention to public affairs: those most 
engaged and interested in public affairs seem to be seeking information that confirms the 
positions that their political ideology would suggest, resulting in confirmation and strengthening 
of their opinions over time.  This is strong evidence for the theory of motivated reasoning in 
accounting for the changing opinion of Americans with respect to climate change.   
 In contrast, direct experience with indicators of climate change had little impact on 
changes in beliefs and attitudes. Experience with hotter summers, drought, and natural disasters 
did not have clear impacts on attitude change.  
The absence of growth in acceptance of climate change since 1990, the increase in 
partisan polarization of opinion, and the finding that direct experience with drought or warmer 
summer temperatures has had little or no impact on belief in the existence of climate change 
suggest that the attitudes of Americans are not very susceptible to influences outside of political 
and economic ideology. Our findings portend that even with news of more summer heat, massive 
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fires, drought and record-breaking storms, an important portion of the population will not accept 
evidence of global climate change.  
  
 26 
 
 
References  
  
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Brian Schaffner. Cooperative Congressional Election Study: 2010-2014 
Panel Study [Computer File] Release 1: June 10, 2015. Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst [producer]. Available from http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XFXJVY.  
———. 2014. Does survey mode still matter? Findings from a 2010 multi-mode comparison. 
Political Analysis 22: 285-303 doi: 10.1093/pan/mpt025. (last accessed 27 April, 2016).  
Båtstrand, Sondre. 2015. More than markets: a comparative study of nine conservative parties on 
climate change.  Politics and Policy 43(4): 538-561. 
Bolsen, Toby, James N. Druckman, and Fay Lomax Cook. 2014a.  How frames can undermind 
support for scientific adaptations: politicization and the status-quo bias.  Public Opinion 
Quarterly 78:1-26.  
______. 2014b. The influence of partisan motivated reasoning on public opinion. Political Behavior 
36: 235-262. 
———. 2015. Citizens’, scientists’, and policy advisors’ beliefs about global warming. The ANNALS 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 658: 271-295. 
Borick, Christopher P. and Barry G. Rabe. 2010. A reason to believe: examining the factors that 
determine individual views on global warming. Social Science Quarterly: 91: 777-800.   
Braman, Donald, Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
and Gregory N. Mandel. 2012. The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on 
perceived climate change risks. Nature Climate Change 2: 732-735.  
 27 
Brody, Samuel D., Sammy Zahran, Arnold Vedlitz, and Himanshu Grover. 2008. Examining the 
relationship between physical vulnerability and public perceptions of global climate change in 
the United States. Environment and Behavior 40 (1): 72-95. 
Brulle, Robert J., Jason Carmichael, and J. Craig Jenkins. 2012. Shifting public opinion on climate 
change: An empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate change in the US, 
2002–2010. Climatic Change 114: 169-188 
Capstick, Stuart, Lorraine Whitmarsh, Wouter Poortinga, Nick Pidgeon, and Paul Upham. 2015. 
International trends in public perceptions of climate change over the past quarter century. WIREs 
Climate Change 6: 35-61. 
Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman, 2007/  A theory of framing and opinion formation in 
competitive elite environments.  Journal of Communication 57 (1): 99-118.   
Clayton, Susan, Patrick Devine-Wright, Paul C. Stern, Lorraine Whitmarsh, Amanda Carrico, Linda 
Step, Janet Swim and Mirilia Bonnes. 2015. Psychological research and global climate change. 
Nature Climate Change 5 (7): 640-646.  
Democratic Party Platform Committee, 2016.  https://www.demconvention.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Democratic-Party-Platform-7.21.16-no-lines.pdf   Last accessed 26 
August 2016.   
Deryugina, Tatyana. 2013. How do people update? The effects of local weather fluctuations on 
beliefs about global warming. Climatic Change 118: 397-416. 
Druckman, James N. 2015. Communicating policy-relevant science. PS: Political Science & Politics 
48: 58-69. 
Druckman, James N. and Toby Bolsen. 2015.  Framing, motivated reasoning, and opinions about 
emergent technologies.  Journal of Communication 61: 659-688.   
 28 
Dunlap, Riley E., and Aaron M. McCright. 2008. A widening gap: Republican and Democratic views 
on climate change. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 50 (5): 26-35. 
Egan, Patrick J. and Megan Mullin. 2012. Turning personal experience into political attitudes: The 
effect of local weather on Americans’ perceptions about global warming. Journal of Politics 74 
(3): 796-809. 
———. 2016. Recent improvement and projected worsening of weather in the United States. Nature 
532: 357-360.  
Elrick-Barr, Carmen E., Timothy F. Smith, Dana C. Thomsen and Benjamin L. Preston.  Perceptions 
of risk among households in two Australian coastal communities.  Geographical Research  53 
(2): 145-159.   
Finucane, Melissa L., Paul Slovic, C. K. Mertz, and Stephen M. Johnson. 2000. Gender, race, and 
perceived risk: The “white male’ effect. Health, Risk & Society 2 (2): 159-172. 
Funk, Cary, and Brian Kennedy. 2016. The Politics of Climate. Pew Research 
Center.  file:///C:/Users/glewis/Downloads/PS_2016.10.04_Politics-of-
Climate_FINAL%20(1).pdf (last accessed 20 October, 2015) 
Gregoire, Caroline, 2015.  "Why some conservatives can't accept that climate change is real."  The 
Huffington Post, December 4, 2015.  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/climate-change-
denial-psychology_us_56438664e4b045bf3ded5ca5  (last accessed 26 August, 2016).   
Guy, Sophie, Hoshihisa Kashima, Iain Walker and Saffron O’Neill. 2014. Investigating the effects of 
knowledge and ideology on climate change beliefs. European Journal of Social Psychology 44 
(5): 421-429.  
 29 
Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute. 2014. The Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database 
for the United States, Version 12.0 [Online Database]. University of South Carolina, 
Columbia, SC. http://hvri.geog.sc.edu/SHELDUS/. (last accessed 27 April, 2016).  
Hamilton, Lawrence C. and Barry D. Keim. 2009. Regional variation in perceptions about climate 
change. International Journal of Climatology 29: 2346-2352.  
———. 2011. Education, politics and opinions about climate change: Evidence for interaction 
effects. Climatic Change 104 (2): 231-242. 
Hamilton, Lawrence C., and Mary D. Stampone. 2013. Blowin’ in the wind: Short-term weather and 
belief in anthropogenic climate change. Weather, Climate and Society 5: 112-119. 
Hart, P. Sol and Erik C. Nisbet. 2011. Boomerang effects in science communication: how motivated 
reasoning and identity cues amplify opinion polarization about climate mitigation policies. 
Communication Research 30 (1): 48-71. 
Heath, Yuko and Robert Gifford. 2006. Free-market ideology and environmental degradation: The 
case of belief in global climate change. Environment and Behavior 38 (1): 48-71. 
Hoffman, Andrew J. 2015.  How Culture Shapes the Climate Change Debate. California: Stanford 
University Press.  
Howe, Peter D., and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2013. Who remembers a hot summer or a cold winter? 
The asymmetric effect of beliefs about global warming on perceptions of local climate 
conditions in the U.S. Global Environmental Change 23 (6): 1488-1500.  
IPSOS MORI, 2014.  Global Trends: 2014.  Environment.   
http://www.ipsosglobaltrends.com/environment.html (last accessed 27 April 2015).  
Kahan, Dan M.. 2015a. Climate-science communication and the measurement problem. Advances in 
Political Psychology 36 (S1): 1-43. 
 30 
———. 2015b. The politically motivated reasoning paradigm. Emerging Trends in Social & 
Behavioral Sciences. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2703011 (last accessed 27 April, 2016).  
Kahan, Dan M., Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic, and C. K. Mertz. 2007. Culture and 
identity-protective cognition: Explaining the white male effect in risk perception. Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 4 (3): 465-505.  
Kahan, Dan M., Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald Braman, 
and Gregory N. Mandel. 2012. The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on 
perceived climate change risks. Nature Climate Change, 2: 732-35. 
Kahan, Dan M., Ellen Peters, Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, Maggie Wittlin, Lisa Larrimore Ouelette, 
and Gregory Mandel. 2011. "The tragedy of the risk-perception commons: Culture conflict, 
rationality conflict, and climate change." Working Paper 89, Yale Law School, Cultural 
Cognition Project, Yale University, New Haven, CT.  https://www.law.upenn.edu/live 
/files/296-kahan-tragedy-of-the-riskperception1pdf  (last accessed 27 April, 2016).  
Katz, Elihu and Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, 1955.  Personal Influence: the part played by people in the 
flow of mass communications.  Glencoe, Il: Free Press. 
Lazarsfeld, Paul, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, 1968.  The People's Choice: how the voter 
makes up his mind in a presidential campaign.  New York: Columbia University Press. 
Lehner, Flavio, and Thomas F. Stoker. 2015. From local perception to global perspective. Nature 
Climate Change 5: 731-35.  
Leiserowitz, Anthony A. and Kenneth Broad. 2006. Climate change risk perception and policy 
preferences: The role of affect, imagery and values. Climate Change 77: 45-72. 
  
 31 
Leiserowitz, Anthony, A., Edward Maibach, Connie Roser-Renoug, Geoff Feinberg, and Seth 
Rosenthal. 2015. Climate change in the American mind: October, 2015. Yale Project on 
Climate Change Communication, Yale University and George Mason University, New Haven, 
CT, 2015.   http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication-OFF/files/Climate-Change-
American-Mind-October-2015.pdf (last accessed 27 April, 2016).  
________ 2016.  Climate change in the American mind: Spring 2016. Yale Project on Climate 
Change Communication, Yale University and George Mason University, New Haven, CT,  
Yale Program on Climate Change Communication.   
Li, Ye, Eric J. Johnson and Lisa Zaval. 2011. Local warming: Daily temperature deviation affects 
beliefs and concern about climate change. Psychological Science 22: 454-459.  
Mastrandrea, Michael D., Amy L. Luers, and Stephen H. Schneider. 2006. Changing perceptions of 
changing risks: Climate change and the California public. Climate Change Project Policy Brief, 
Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.  
McCright, Aaron M., and Riley E. Dunlap. 2011. The politicization of climate change and 
polarization in the American public’s views of global warming, 2001-2010. The Sociological 
Quarterly 52 (2): 155-194. 
McCright, Aaron M., Raley E. Dunlap and Chenyang Xiao, 2014.  Increasing influence of party 
identification on perceived scientific agreement and support for government action on climate 
change in the United States, 2006-2012.  AMS Journals online, DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00058.1 (last accessed 26 August, 2016).   
Menne, Matthew J., Imke Durre, Russell S. Vose, Byron E. Gleason and Tamara G. Houston. 2012. 
An overview of the Global Historical Climatology Network-Daily Database. Journal of 
Atmospheric and Oceanic Technology 29: 897-910.  
 32 
Mills, Sarah B., Christopher Borick, and Barry G. Rabe. 2016.  Fewer Americans Doubt Global 
Warming is Occurring: a report from the National Surveys on Energy and Environment.  Issues 
in Energy and Environmental Policy (29, July 2016).   
Moussaîd, Mehdi, Juliane E. Kåmmer, Pantelis P. Analytis, and Hansjørg Neth. 2013.  Social 
influence and the collective dynamics of opinion formation.   
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0078433  (last accessed 10 August 2016).   
Nickerson, Raymond S. 1998. Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review 
of General Psychology 2 (2): 175–220. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 
Republican National Committee, 2016.  https://prod-static-ngop-
pbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf 
 (Last accessed 26 August, 2016).   
Riffkin, R., 2014.  Climate change not a top worry in US.  Politics, March 12, 2014.  
http://www.gallup.com/poll/167843/climate-change-not-top-worry.aspx. (last accessed 27 
April, 2016).  
Roser-Renouf, Connie, Edward Maibach, Anthony Leiserowitz, Geoff Feinberg, Seth Rosenthal, and 
Jennifer Kreslake. 2014. Global warming's six Americas, October, 2014: Perception of the 
health consequences of global warming and update on key beliefs. Yale University and George 
Mason University. New Haven, CT: Yale Project on Climate Change Communication.  
Saad, Lydia. "A steady 57% in U.S. blame humans for global warming," Gallup. Last modified 
March 18, 2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/167972/steady-blame-humans-global-
warming.aspx 
———. "U.S. views on climate change stable after extreme winter," Gallup. Last modified March 
25, 2015. http://www.gallup.com/poll/182150/views-climate-change-stable-extreme-winter.aspx 
 33 
Schaffner, Brian F., and Stephen Ansolabehere. 2015a .  CCES Panel 2010-2014. 
https://ccesconference.byu.edu/Documents/schaffner_presentation_sundance.pdf  (last 
accessed 27 April, 2016).  
________.  Guide to the 2010-2014 CCES Panel Study.  Data Release: No. 1, June 10, 2015 b.  
http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/book/study-design (last accessed 23 August, 2016).     
Spence, Alexa, Wouter Poortinga, Catherine Butler, and Nick F. Pidgeon. 2011. Perceptions of 
climate change and willingness to save energy related to flood experience. Nature Climate 
Change 1: 46-49. 
Stata, Version 14.  StataCorp LP, College Station Texas, USA 
Trenberth, Kevin E., John T. Fasullo, and Theodore G. Sheperd. 2015. Attribution of climate extreme 
events. Nature Climate Change 5: 725-730. 
van der Linden, Sander. 2014. On the relationship between personal experience, affect and risk 
perception: The case of climate change. European Journal of Social Psychology 44 (5): 430–
440. 
———. 2015. The social-psychological determinants of climate change risk perceptions: Towards a 
comprehensive model. Journal of Environmental Psychology 41: 112-124. 
Watts, Duncan J. and Peter Sheridan Dodds.  Influentials, Networks, and Public Opinion Formation.  
Journal of Consumer Research 34 (4):441-458.  
Weber, Elke U. 2010. What shapes perceptions of climate change? WIRES Climate Change 1: 332-
342.  
Williams, Richard A. 2005. Gologit2: A program for generalized logistic regression/partial 
proportional odds models for ordinal dependent variables. 
http://www.stata.com/meeting/4nasug/gologit2.pdf. (last accessed 27 April, 2016).  
 34 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M, 2010.  Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Second 
Edition.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.   
Zaller, John R.  1992.  The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Zavel, Lisa, Elizabeth A. Keenan, Eric J. Johnson, and Elke U. Weber. 2014. How warm days 
increase belief in global warming. Nature Climate Change 4: 143-47. 
Zia, Asim, and Anne Marie Todd. 2010. Evaluating the effects of ideology on public understanding 
of climate change science: How to improve communication across ideological divides?” Public 
Understanding of Science 19 (6): 743-761.  
 
RISA PALM is Professor in the Department of Geosciences and Provost at Georgia State University, 
Atlanta, GA  30302.  Email: risapalm@gsu.edu.  Her research interests include natural hazards 
and climate change response and urban geography. 
GREGORY B. LEWIS is Professor and Chair of the Department of Public Management and Policy 
in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University.  Email: 
glewis@gsu.edu.  His research focuses on public opinion on LGBT rights and on diversity issues 
in public employment. 
BO FENG is Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Public Management and Policy in the Andrew 
Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University. Email: bfeng1@gsu.edu. His 
research interests lie broadly within public policy, with specific interest within the field of health 
economics. 
  
 
 35 
 
